

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 DOEE-00 /026 W
-----105642 141923Z /42
O 141810Z MAR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7195
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 03968

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: VIEWS OF SOVIET DEPREP ON
VERIFICATION ISSUES

REF: STATE 63431 (STATE CTB MESSAGE #11)

CTB MESSAGE NO. 171

1. SUMMARY. DURING INFORMAL CONVERSATION, MAINLY ON
SCHEDULE OF WORK, BETWEEN SOV DEPREP (TIMERBAEV) AND
US ALTREP (NEIDLE), TIMERBAEV INSISTED IT WAS VERY IMPOR-
TANT TO KNOW APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF INTERNAL SEISMIC
INSTALLATIONS US WAS THINKING ABOUT. IN ACCORDANCE WITH
REFTEL AND US DEL'S STANDING INSTRUCTIONS, US REP SAID
THAT WE WERE CONSIDERING NETWORKS RANGING UP TO AROUND
20 INSTALLATIONS. TIMERBAEV EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND SAID
HE HAD BEEN THINKING OF ABOUT SEVEN. ON US REQUIREMENT
FOR AN AGREED UNDERSTANDING REGARDING LAUNCHING OF ON-SITE
INSPECTIONS, TIMERBAEV EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT THIS

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WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM. ON QUESTION OF RIGHTS AND FUNC-
TIONS FOR OSIS, SOVS PARTICULARLY OBJECTED TO LISTS OF
EQUIPMENT IN US DEL'S PROPOSED LANGUAGE; SOVS WOULD,
HOWEVER, BE PREPARED TO HAVE IMPORTANT RIGHTS AND
FUNCTIONS AGREED IN ADVANCE IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT.
THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS SUMMARIZE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE
CONVERSATION. END SUMMARY.

2. METHOD OF WORK. US REP BEGAN CONVERSATION BY REGISTERING CONCERN AT CONFLICTING AND CONFUSING STATEMENTS WHICH WERE COMING FROM VARIOUS LEVELS OF SOVIET DEL, EXPLAINING THAT THIS CREATED CONSIDERABLE UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHAT WAS BEST WAY TO PURSUE OUR WORK AND TO MAKE CONCRETE PROGRESS ON VARIOUS ISSUES. CONFUSION WAS PARTICULARLY EVIDENT IN CONNECTION WITH PROCEDURES FOR LAUNCHING OSIS, I.E., THE "SEISMIC EVENT" ISSUE. TIMERBAEV ACKNOWLEDGED THERE HAD BEEN MANY DIFFERING STATEMENTS FROM THE SOVIET DEL. ON LAUNCHING OF OSIS, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO MOSCOW AND TO THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL TO SEE IF CONCRETE PROGRESS COULD STILL BE MADE DURING THIS SESSION. HE BELIEVED A DRAFTING GROUP WOULD NOW HAVE A FAIR CHANCE OF HAMMERING OUT SOME LANGUAGE SATISFACTORY TO BOTH SIDES.

3. AGREED UNDERSTANDING ON OSIS. US REP ASKED WHETHER SOVDEL WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE AGREED UNDERSTANDING WE HAD PROPOSED. HE REMINDED TIMERBAEV THAT THIS WAS AN ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE US AND SOVIETS MIGHT AS WELL COME TO GRIPS WITH IT NOW INSTEAD OF LATER. TIMERBAEV SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE A PROBLEM WITH THE UNDERSTANDING AND, IN RESPONSE TO US REP'S URGING, SAID HE WOULD SEE WHETHER HIS DEL COULD BEGIN TO WORK ON THIS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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4. INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS (ISIS). US REP REVIEWED FOR TIMERBAEV VARIOUS ASPECTS OF US APPROACH, ESPECIALLY WHY ENTIRE PROBLEM COULD NOT BE LEFT TO THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (JCC) AND WHY THERE HAD TO BE CONTINUING FLOW OF RELIABLE, AUTHENTICATED DATA (AS OPPOSED TO POSSIBILITY MENTIONED BY SOME SOVDEL MEMBERS THAT DATA FROM ISIS MIGHT BE MADE AVAILABLE ONLY WHEN OUR NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS DETECTED A PARTICULAR EVENT ON WHICH WE WANTED MORE DATA FOR PURPOSES OF IDENTIFICATION). TIMERBAEV RESPONDED THAT IT WAS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT FOR THE SOVIETS TO KNOW ABOUT HOW MANY STATIONS THE US WAS THINKING OF. US REP RESPONDED THAT WE WERE CONSIDERING NETWORKS RANGING UP TO AROUND 20 INSTALLATIONS. TIMERBAEV LOOKED GENUINELY SURPRISED AND SAID, "OH, MY GOODNESS". AFTER A PAUSE, HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN THINKING THAT AROUND SEVEN WOULD BE A GOOD NUMBER. US REP RESPONDED THAT SEVEN WAS REALLY ONLY ABOUT THE SAME AS FIVE, WHICH THE SOVIETS HAD ALREADY OFFERED.

5. RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. US REP

COMPLAINED THAT SOVIETS WERE NOT BEING REALISTIC, AND WERE INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR PRIOR AGREEMENT TO HAVE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS SPECIFIED IN ADVANCE, WHEN THEY SAID THAT ALL THE DETAILS SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE JCC. TIMERBAEV SAID THIS WAS NOT THE SOVIET APPROACH. THERE WOULD BE SOME DETAILED PROVISIONS AGREED IN ADVANCE. THE SOVIETS BELIEVED HOWEVER THAT THE US DEL HAD GONE TOO FAR IN CALLING FOR TOO MUCH DETAIL, ESPECIALLY IN THE LISTS OF EQUIPMENT. TO ILLUSTRATE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO HAVE SOME

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-----105653 141928Z /42

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FM USMISSION GENEVA
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PASS TO DOE

IMPORTANT PREAGREED RIGHTS, TIMERBAEV CITED THE SPECIFIC POINTS IN MOROKHOV'S MARCH 10 PLENARY SPEECH, ESPECIALLY THE RIGHT OF THE INSPECTORS TO CONFIRM THAT THE INSPECTION AREA WAS THE ONE THAT HAD BEEN REQUESTED. TIMERBAEV SAID THIS WAS A VERY IMPORTANT POINT WHICH US DEL HAD NOT EVEN ASKED FOR. THERE HAD BEEN SOME IN THE SOVIET DELEGATION WHO HAD OPPOSED THIS SUGGESTION, BUT HE AND MOROKHOV HAD INSISTED THAT IT BE INCLUDED. WARNKE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, NEGOTIATIONS, NUCLEAR TESTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 14 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978GENEVA03968
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780113-0825
Format: TEL
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780372/aaaacjcd.tel
Line Count: 161
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 86f1f5c7-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 78 STATE 63431
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 15 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3344119
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: VIEWS OF SOVIET DEPREP ON VERIFICATION ISSUES
TAGS: PARM, US, UK, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/86f1f5c7-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014